John Hibbing, Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2002. Stealth Democracy. Cambridge Press.

The authors point out that very few, if any, studies about how Americans actually would like government to operate have been done. In essence, they carry out a large-scale user study of American citizens. And uncover some interesting things. They start by disabusing the notion that all of politics can be broken down into a policy space, with preferences ranging from liberal to conservative. Rather, the manner in which government is conducted--the process space--matters greatly. Adding this extra dimension goes a long way. They then delve into people's desirable governmental processes.

The American people would not by default participate in government if only they were given a chance by institutional innovations. Rather, they favor process changes and moves toward a more direct democracy only because there is widespread conviction that all politicians are in WA to act in purely self-interested ways, exasperated especially by the corrupting influence of lobbyist boogymen, at the expense of the average citizen. "People often view their political involvement as medicine they must take in order to keep the disease of greedy politicians and special interests from getting further out of hand" (131). This perception is so widespread that it is one of the only ways by which Americans can actually discuss politics, albeit in abstract terms, as it doesn't conjure up any conflict. If given the choice between a political system that operates in the background by empathetic, non-self interested decision-making elites and greater involvement in politics, Americans would take the former. The authors call this "stealth democracy", where people know that they could step in at anytime if they feel that they are being taken as suckers, but in general, not have to be routinely involved in politics (people go out of their way to avoid politics). More evidence against the build-it-and-they-will-come stance.

The authors trace this finding to a couple aspects of common sense in America today, including the aforementioned perception of selfish politicians making suckers of citizens. They point to an astonishing aversion to conflict, not just because its unpleasant, but because there is a false attribution of widespread consensus on action that agrees with their own position (132). Moreover, there is a false perception that because many Americans share many of the same goals, that there is no legitimacy to any political conflicts -- political opponents of the individual's opinion must be corrupted by special interests and others are radicals or reactionaries. "Why should the public favorably view processes designed to resolve conflict if they deny the existence of legitimate conflict?" (134) This is exasperated by a perception that shared goals translate directly into obvious action, rather than acknowledge the vastly different policy means by which to attempt to achieve common goals.

The authors state that the arguments for more deliberative democratic institutions--(1) make better decisions, (2) be perceived as legitimate, and (3) will help the people become better--are all bogus, or at least not backed by empirical evidence. One of their major statements is that deliberation can be harmful; it is not a "no-lose" (190) situation as some deliberation theorists appear to assume. It can "fan emotions unproductively, exacerbate rather than diminish power differentials among those deliberating, can make people feel frustrated with the system that made them deliberate, is ill-suited to many issues, and can lead to worse decisions than would have occurred if no deliberation had taken place" (191). "The media are unlikely to offer much help in raising the level of discourse. The media are more than eager to contribute to people's thirst for the personal and irrelevant" (196). Perhaps most damning, points to a number of problems with equalizing power in deliberations, as "the fact that deliberation in real-world settings tends to disempower the timid, quiet, and uneducated relative to the loquacious, extroverted, and well schooled is particularly difficult for deliberation theorists to swallow, since much of the theory's original appeal was based on its radical elan" (203). The authors point to the "spiral of silence" in how consensus plays out, as well as Habermas' later support for more representative democracy. How is non-face-to-face online interaction affected (C&B try to address this, unsatisfactorily if I remember)? I wonder how the use of small groups in workshop settings works, as with Community Dialogs (Weeks 2000). It seemed to work for Eugene, but in Sacramento, with wider SES gaps, some groups were definitely coopted by activists.

Anyway, the authors conclude with a discussion about what it would look like if Americans got their way (not a pretty looking picture) and then some policy suggestions. They focus on the need for civics education reform, for a shift toward engendering a respect for the legitimacy of conflict and how to handle conflict, as opposed to the whitewashing that happens today. "By adopting a head-in-the-sand approach to conflict, the educational community is unwittingly facilitating the lack of issue relevance in American politics and is encouraging students to conclude that real democracy is unnecessary and stealth democracy will do just fine" (147). I'm wondering if there are other incremental solutions (as this is a multi-lifetime problem). For example, creating local pockets of deliberation where some of these norms are engendered. Wikipedia as well.

interesting

• they divide democratic procedures into two dimensions (pre-decision considered by and decision-by) and break it out into a 2x2 table and then plot different institutions on that space (164). It would be very interesting to consider this model with respect to the three spheres of activity.
• points to Morell 1999 Citizens' evaluations of participatory democratic procedures (political research quarterly 52) as testing the hypothesis as to whether deliberative processes would increase the perceived legitimacy of decisions (199). He found no such correlation. Of course, its impossible to establish deliberative norms in experimental settings.
• some of what they discussion begs the question as to how to sustain critical mass. Probably won't have large-scale, routine interaction, but might engender large-scale input on dead-locked issues. Everyday issues seems like you'd want to depend on some public sphere to inform, but not determine, action